Laundering AI Authority with Adversarial Examples

Jie Zhang Pura Peetathawatchai Florian Tramèr Avital Shafran
ETH Zurich
Switzerland

Abstract

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as trusted authorities—fact-checking images on social media, comparing products, and moderating content. Users implicitly trust that these systems perceive the same visual content as they do. We show that adversarial examples break this assumption, enabling *AI authority laundering*: an attacker subtly perturbs an image so that the VLM produces confident and authoritative responses about the *wrong* input. Unlike jailbreaks or prompt injections, our attacks do not compromise model alignment; the attack operates entirely at the perceptual level. We demonstrate that standard attacks against publicly available CLIP models transfer reliably to production VLMs—including GPT-5.4, Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3, and Grok 4.2. Across four attack surfaces, we show that authority laundering can amplify misinformation, disparage individuals, evade content moderation, and manipulate product recommendations. Our attacks have high success rates: In hundreds of attacks targeting identity manipulation and NSFW evasion, we measure success rates of 22–100% across six models. No novel attack algorithm is required: basic techniques known for over a decade suffice, establishing a lower bound on attacker capability that should concern defenders. Our results demonstrate that visual adversarial robustness is now a practical—and still largely unsolved—safety problem.

Warning: This paper contains images and model outputs that may be offensive or disturbing.

1 Introduction

Adversarial examples have captivated the machine learning security community for more than a decade. Since the seminal discoveries that neural networks are vulnerable to imperceptible perturbations [9, 53], thousands of papers have explored how to craft, transfer, and defend against these attacks in computer vision settings [1, 2]. Yet, despite intense research interest, adversarial examples have mostly remained a theoretical curiosity: a fascinating failure mode with limited practical consequence. The canonical demonstrations involve making a classifier mistake a panda for a gibbon, or a cat for guacamole. Critics have reasonably asked: *so what?* [10, 39, 55].

We argue that the deployment of vision-language models (VLMs) as *trusted authorities* in online information ecosystems gives new credence to these attacks. VLMs integrated on social platforms (e.g., Grok on 𝕏 [60]), search engines and shopping agents [24, 41] no longer serve as mere classifiers, producing labels humans can easily inspect and question; they produce *authoritative natural-language judgments* for users. When a user invokes Grok to fact-check an image on 𝕏, or asks ChatGPT to compare products, they implicitly assume that the model perceives the same visual content they do.

Adversarial examples violate this assumption. A subtly perturbed image appears benign to a human observer, yet causes the VLM to reason about an entirely different semantic reality chosen by the attacker. The model's confident, well-reasoned response then delivers the attacker's narrative as if it were the system's honest assessment. We call this *AI authority laundering*: the attacker's chosen falsehood is laundered through the AI's trusted-authority status and presented to the user as objective analysis.

We demonstrate authority laundering in four broad attack settings: (1) amplify misinformation and dangerous advice; (2) disparage individuals; (3) evade content filters; and (4) manipulate product recommendations. Figure 1 illustrates possible attacks: a slightly perturbed image of a news event can fuel conspiracy theories when the AI authority asserts the event is fake (top, left); dangerous medical advice can be confidently endorsed, such as approving a teratogenic drug as safe to take during pregnancy (top, middle); public-figure protection filters can be bypassed to generate harmful or derogatory content (top, right); the reputation of a public figure can be damaged by linking them to criminal behavior (bottom, left); shopping assistants can be manipulated to advocate for attacker-chosen products (bottom, middle); and content moderation policies can be exploited for generating and spreading inappropriate content on social media platforms (bottom, right). In all cases, our attacks weaponize the trustworthiness and truthfulness that AI assistants aim to promote to their users.

Critically, authority laundering is *not* a misalignment attack. The model responds helpfully, harmlessly, and honestly *to what it (incorrectly) perceives*. This distinguishes our threat model from jailbreaks [45, 69] and prompt injections [6, 59], which subvert the model's policy or instructions. It also makes alignment-based defenses (safety fine-tuning, refusal training) irrelevant against our attacks. The relevant—and largely unsolved—problem is adversarial robustness of visual representations.

Mounting these attacks is alarmingly easy. Using only vanilla PGD [34] against an ensemble of publicly available CLIP models (a technique proposed in 2016 [33]), we craft perturbations that transfer reliably to production systems whose architectures and weights are entirely unknown to us: GPT 5.4 [43], Gemini 3.1 Pro [17], Claude Opus 4.6 [4], and Grok 4.2 [61]. In controlled evaluations, our attacks achieve success rates up to 100% for some scenarios.

We deliberately do not use a novel attack algorithm, as our goal is to establish a *lower bound* on the attacker's capabilities. If the simplest known attack already works, the true threat is strictly worse. Our results show that visual adversarial robustness is now a practical safety concern and that **as long as it remains unsolved, VLM outputs should not be presented as authoritative**.

Our findings add to growing concerns about the reliability of AI systems as arbiters of online information, which are already prone to biases [3, 30, 35] and hallucinations that generate plausible but false information [27]. We reveal a complementary vulnerability: even when models function exactly as intended, adversaries can manipulate what they perceive to produce misleading outputs at scale.



Figure 1: Examples of *AI authority laundering* attacks against production VLMs, spanning four attack families: narrative manipulation, identity manipulation, commercial fraud, and evasion of safety filters. In each case, an adversarial perturbation of the input image causes the model to respond honestly and within policy to a different semantic content than what the user or platform sees, laundering the attacker's chosen narrative or request through the model's authority. Sensitive imagery has been censored to ensure appropriate academic presentation.

More broadly, our paper illustrates how threats long dismissed as *impractical* can gain critical relevance as technology is deployed in new and unforeseen contexts.

Our contributions are three-fold:

(1) **Threat model.** We formally define AI authority laundering (§3), a threat in which adversarial perturbations redirect a VLM's perception to an attacker-chosen semantic target, causing it to deliver a false narrative through its authority channel. We identify three attack surfaces: epistemic manipulation, identity laundering, and commercial fraud, and characterize prompt-controlled vs. prompt-uncontrolled settings.

(2) **Systematic evaluation.** We present an extensive evaluation of authority laundering against 6 production VLMs using 7 case studies, demonstrating practical attack vectors with far-reaching consequences.

(3) **The low attack bar.** We show that vanilla PGD on open-source surrogates already suffices for consistent and targeted manipulation of frontier VLMs across all attack surfaces, establishing that visual robustness should be treated as a first-class security concern and that VLM outputs should be perceived with radical skepticism.

2 Related Work

Adversarial examples in vision. Adversarial examples [22, 53], are slightly perturbed inputs that are perceived incorrectly by a machine learning model. A key property is *transferability*: perturbations crafted against one model often fool others, even across architectures [33, 44]. Proof-of-concept attacks exist for safety- or security-critical scenarios such as autonomous driving [21, 37], face recognition [51], or perceptual hashing [46]. However, in practice, simpler strategies (e.g., physical stickers, out-of-distribution inputs) often achieve the same ends without requiring imperceptibility [10, 39, 55]. Our work identifies a deployment context—VLMs as trusted authorities—in which imperceptibility *itself* is the property that enables harm: the user has no signal that the model is responding to a different image than the one they see.

Jailbreaks, prompt injections, and behavioral manipulation. Text-based jailbreaks [58, 69] bypass alignment training to produce unsafe outputs; prompt injections [59] break the instruction–data boundary to hijack models. Multimodal variants of these attacks inject instructions through images or directly optimize image perturbations to elicit policy-violating behavior [6, 8, 11, 47, 52, 65]. All of these attacks share a common mechanism: inducing *misaligned behavior*. Authority laundering is structurally different—the

model's alignment is never compromised; the attack substitutes *what the model sees*, not *what it does*. Consequently, alignment-based defenses are irrelevant to our threat.

Adversarial manipulation of multimodal representations. Recent work shows that small perturbations can align an image's embedding to an arbitrary target in a shared space [67], and that such perturbations transfer from open-source CLIP ensembles to production VLMs [14, 26, 32]. We build on these findings, but ask a question prior work did not: **what can an attacker cause a human user to believe as a result?** We bridge the gap between the established technical feasibility of representation-level attacks and concrete, quantified harms against production systems.

The transferability of perturbed images differs by attack type. Image-based jailbreaks or prompt injections transfer unreliably across models [23, 49, 50], while misrecognition-style perturbations—which we use—have been found to transfer consistently because they target low-level perceptual representations shared across architectures [26, 32]. Our results confirm this pattern.

AI systems and disinformation. The risk of AI systems being weaponized to amplify disinformation has been recognized across multiple attack surfaces. Training-time backdoors can "spin" model outputs toward an adversary-chosen sentiment [7]. VLMs can exhibit demographic biases [64] and hallucinate false information [31]. We reveal a complementary vulnerability: even when models function exactly as intended, adversaries can manipulate what they perceive at inference time to produce *targeted* false outputs.

3 Threat Model

We study a class of attacks on vision-language models (VLM) that we call *AI authority laundering attacks*: the adversary uses the VLM as an unwitting intermediary that confers its authority, either epistemic or compliance (defined below), on content that the attacker could not produce or pass off on their own. The mechanism is the same in all cases: a carefully crafted image is processed by the VLM in one way, but appears to some external observer in a different way, and the adversary exploits the gap between the two interpretations. We refer to this mechanism as a *perceptual-discrepancy attack*.

This section defines the threat model at this level of generality. We postpone the choice of attack vector (adversarial examples) to Section 4, where we describe how it instantiates the idealized attacker introduced below.

3.1 Two Kinds of Authority

Modern VLMs are granted authority of two distinct kinds, both of which the adversary may seek to launder.

Epistemic authority. The model's assertions are treated as trustworthy, and some users update their beliefs based on what the model says. Laundering this authority means inducing the model to assert, honestly from its perspective, something the adversary wants the audience to believe: a piece of misinformation, a dubious product recommendation, a piece of dangerous advice, etc.

Compliance authority. The model's decisions to engage are treated as safety judgments, i.e., a platform hosts content that the model willingly processed. Laundering this authority means inducing the model to engage with content it would otherwise refuse, e.g., by generating disallowed content, or accepting an image as input that a filter would reject, all under the belief that the request is legitimate.

The two kinds of authority share the same precondition: the model must be "aligned" (or at least be perceived as such by its users). A model with no reputation for honesty has no epistemic authority to launder, and a model with no reputation for safety has no compliance authority to launder. This is why our attacks *exploit* alignment rather than break it. The model never knowingly lies or violates policy; it acts honestly and within policy on a perception the adversary has manipulated.

3.2 Adversary, Model, and Observer

We formalize an attack setting involving three parties. The *model* is a deployed VLM that consumes an image together with a textual prompt and produces a response (text, image or both). The *adversary* controls the image fed to the model and in some deployments also the prompt. The *observer* is whoever – or whatever – is meant to consume the content that should have been rejected without the model's laundered authority: a human user who sees and believes a manipulated claim, or (in some cases) an image generator that manipulates images despite a policy violation.

An attack succeeds when two conditions hold simultaneously:

(1) **Behavioral goal.** The model's response advances an adversarial objective by exercising authority on the adversary's behalf, such as spreading a false narrative, producing disallowed content, promoting poor products, and so on.
(2) **Observer constraint;** Some external observer views the model conversation (input and output) as indistinguishable from an attacker-chosen reference (e.g., human users view the model conversation as indistinguishable from a benign one).

Both conditions are necessary. An attack that changes the model's behavior but is obvious to the observer is not useful, and an input that looks benign but fails to move the model in an adversarially meaningful way is not an attack.

We deliberately do not yet fix what "adversarial objective" and "attacker-chosen reference" mean: the definition is part of the deployment, not of the attack. This lets our framework cover attacks whose observers are very different in nature, as we discuss next.

3.3 Attack Classes

We consider four families of attacks in this paper. The first three launder epistemic authority; the last launders compliance authority.

Narrative manipulation (epistemic). The adversary wants the model to assert something false or harmful such as endorsing a conspiracy or giving dangerous advice. The observer is the human user reading the conversation, and the observer constraint is that the image accompanying the exchange looks like an ordinary picture relevant to the topic. The model's truthful presentation is what makes the false claim land.

Identity manipulation (epistemic). The adversary wants the model to attribute false claims to a particular individual whose picture is shown to the VLM. As above, the observer is the human user who expects to see an ordinary picture of the individual in question.

The model's ability to correctly identify (famous) individuals and attribute facts to them is what is being laundered.

Commercial fraud (epistemic). The adversary wants the model, acting as a search agent, to recommend or purchase a particular product. The observer is now a downstream auditor (human or automated) who may later inspect the image of the product. The constraint here is plausible deniability: the image must look like a routine submission so that the adversarial manipulation is hard to attribute after the fact. The model's reputation for being a reliable verifier is what makes the verdict carry weight.

Evasion of safety filters (compliance). The adversary wants a platform's VLM (e.g., Grok on 𝕏) to process or generate content that a moderation filter would reject if presented directly—e.g., violent imagery, sexual content, copyrighted material. Here, the observer constraint is the opposite of benign: the conversation should clearly violate some content policy, and the observer (either the attacker themselves or other users exposed to the attacker's content) should recognize it as such, while the model does not. For image generation tasks, another observer is the system's image generator module (typically some type of diffusion model) that should generate content that is policy violating. The model's willingness to engage with the task launders the disallowed content as "AI-approved" and thus policy-compliant, allowing it to be posted on the platform.

In all four families, the attack is powered by the same mechanism: the input is processed by the model as if it were something it is not, and the observer accepts it as something it is not. Only the definitions of "processed as" and "accepted as" change.

3.4 An Idealized Attacker: The Perception Oracle

Before describing any concrete attack, it is useful to ask what would be possible if the adversary had unlimited control over the model's perception. We call this hypothetical attacker the *perception oracle*.

The perception oracle can independently choose:

- a *source* image $\texttt{img}_{\text{src}}$ shown to the observer(s) and *unknown* to the VLM,
- a *target* image (or concept) `target` processed by the VLM and unknown to the observer(s), and
- possibly, the prompt `Q` accompanying the query (in some settings, the query is chosen by benign end-users).

The observer then sees only the source image, while the VLM receives the target as input and behaves accordingly in a **fully aligned and honest** way. The model is not jailbroken or prompt injected, or coaxed into contradicting its safety training by other means. It simply and honestly answers queries about the target that it perceives.

This framing clarifies what authority laundering can and cannot do. The attacker *exploits* the model's alignment rather than breaking it. A non-aligned model would have nothing worth laundering. Because the VLM applies its authority faithfully to what it sees, the attacker's job reduces to finding a triple $(\texttt{img}_{\text{src}}, \texttt{target}, \texttt{Q})$ where:

(1) the model's honest response to the `target` under prompt `Q` produces the desired adversarial behavior, and
(2) the source image $\texttt{img}_{\text{src}}$ satisfies the observer's constraint.



(a) Without prompt control: the oracle fails.

(b) With prompt control: the rumor spreads through Grok on 𝕏.

Figure 2: Fake news made possible through prompt control: a *narrative manipulation* attack that propagates a rumor through honest model behavior. In both cases, the source image is a news headline claiming a billionaire died, and the target is a picture of Elon Musk. In (a) Grok naturally rejects the narrative that someone famous died as there is no other corroborating information; in (b) the prompt is more generic. From Grok's perspective, it is simply asked to identify Elon Musk in a picture—oblivious to the context.

Some attacks appear immediately in this setting. For example, if the adversary wants the model to misidentify person A as person B, they pick as target an image of person B and as source an image of person A; the aligned VLM describes what it sees (person B).

Other attacks are impossible, however: without prompt control, the oracle cannot coerce a model with access to real-time information to say "Elon Musk died today" in response to the question "who

died today?". No target image makes that an honest answer given the model's knowledge. As illustrated in Figure 2, the adversary uses a headline such as *"famous billionaire passed away"* as the source image (visible to the observer), pairs it with a photo of Elon Musk as the target image, and asks *"who is it?"*. The model's honest identification — "Elon Musk" — becomes an authoritative falsehood when read together with the source image, even though the model itself never states that anyone has died.

The oracle setting therefore serves two purposes in our threat model: (1) It is a *planning abstraction* for the adversary, who must first decide what triple $(\texttt{img}_{\text{src}}, \texttt{target}, \texttt{Q})$ would achieve the goal in the absence of any implementation constraint; and (2) an *upper bound* on what authority-laundering attacks can achieve via perceptual discrepancies: behaviors not reachable by the oracle are not reachable by any attack in this class.

3.5 Adversary Capabilities

In the rest of the paper we study how to approximate the perception oracle using adversarial examples. Concretely, we assume the adversary has:

- only black-box access to the target VLM, but white-box access to one or more public vision encoders that serve as proxies for the VLM's;
- control over the source image $\texttt{img}_{\text{src}}$ submitted to the VLM, and the choice of target `target`;
- in some deployments, control over the prompt as well; we state this explicitly when relevant.

The adversary has no knowledge of the model's weights or architecture, its system prompt, or its training. They do not require access to the user's side of the conversation at inference time.

These assumptions are standard for work on adversarial examples against deployed VLMs and are realistic for closed models against which adversarial examples transfer from open proxies.

In practice, an attacker can likely *test* its adversarial perturbations in isolation (e.g., through a model API, or a private social media account) before launching them in the wild. As a result, the success rates we report should be taken as strict lower bounds: a motivated attacker can simply try multiple variants of source and target images until they find a combination that succeeds.

4 AI Authority Laundering Attacks

With the threat model in place, we can describe our attacks concretely. They all follow the same two-stage pipeline: first, plan the attack as if we were the perception oracle of Section 3.4; second, approximate the oracle using an adversarial example crafted against the VLM's vision encoder (by transferring an attack created against public models). The first stage is where the adversary's creativity lives and where the different attack families diverge; the second stage is a shared and standard optimization problem.

4.1 Stage 1: Designing an Oracle Attack

At the oracle level, the adversary chooses a source image, a target image or concept, and (optionally) a prompt so that an honest response from the VLM achieves the attack's goal while the source satisfies the observer. In practice, the structure of this choice consists of a few recurring patterns, which we illustrate below.

Target carries the payload; source is a cover. This is the simplest pattern and the typical one for laundering epistemic authority. Pick as target an image whose honest description *is* the adversarial output, and pick as source anything the observer will accept. For example, to make a model produce a misleading caption about a current event, the target is a picture of the wrong event; the source is a benign image matching the ostensible topic. To elicit dangerous advice, the target is an image that an aligned VLM would legitimately describe as safe; the source depicts something dangerous.

Target reframes context; prompt is generic. This is a variant of the above pattern, when the adversary controls the prompt. If adversarial behavior cannot be elicited by an image alone (because no honest description of a picture yields the desired goal), the attacker can move part of the context into the source image (so that the VLM does not see it) and ask a more ambiguous prompt that the VLM answers about the target. The Musk-headline example from Section 3.4 does exactly this: the source provides a context ("a billionaire died") and the prompt is a generic ("who is this?") question that applies both to the context and the target, but with very different expected answers.

Target bypasses a filter; source satisfies a visual constraint. This is a typical pattern for laundering compliance authority. The source image (and/or the model output) is something that would trigger a policy filter (e.g., for processing disallowed input or generating explicit content). The target is chosen so that any policy filters are bypassed.

What makes stage-1 design nontrivial. In all three patterns, the adversary cannot pick targets arbitrarily. The target must be one whose honest interpretation by the VLM lands on the intended behavior, which often requires probing the model's preferences (how it captions ambiguous scenes, what labels it attaches to stylized images, which concepts it refuses when presented visually, etc.)

As we will see in Section 5, additional constraints appear when we instantiate the oracle with adversarial examples. Specifically, we need to be able to create a successful transferable adversarial example from the source to the target. Empirically, this is easier for some forms of sources and targets than for others.

4.2 Stage 2: Instantiating the Oracle with Adversarial Examples

Given a planned oracle attack $(\texttt{img}_{\text{src}}, \texttt{target}, \texttt{Q})$, stage 2 produces a single image $\texttt{img}_{\text{adv}}$ that the VLM processes as if it were the target while the observer accepts as if it were the source images. We do this by optimizing the adversarial example $\texttt{img}_{\text{adv}}$ to minimize the distance between its vision-encoder embedding and that of the target, subject to a constraint that keeps it close to the source image under whatever metric the observer uses.

Concretely, given an ensemble $E = (f_1, \ldots, f_k)$ of local image encoders, we solve the standard optimization problem [33]:

$$\begin{aligned} \texttt{img}_{\text{adv}} = \arg\max_{x} & \sum_{f \in E} \text{Sim}\left(f(x), f(\texttt{target})\right) \\ \text{subject to} \quad & \|x - \texttt{img}_{\text{src}}\|_\infty \leq \varepsilon, \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where Sim is cosine similarity. During optimization, we apply differentiable data augmentations to $\texttt{img}_{\text{adv}}$ to improve transferability [62]. The optimization itself is standard projected gradient descent [34] on Equation (1).

The remainder of the paper evaluates this construction for the four attack families of Section 3.3 and studies the factors that determine its success rate.

5 Validating Authority Laundering in the Wild

We now demonstrate AI authority laundering attacks in production VLMs deployed as trusted authorities in online information ecosystems. Our case studies span social media chatbots, AI assistants, web search agents, and content moderation systems, and cover the four attack surfaces identified in Section 3.3—misinformation amplification (Section 5.1), identity manipulation (Section 5.2), content moderation evasion (Section 5.3) and commercial fraud (Section 5.4).

Experimental setup. All case studies use the attack algorithm from Section 3 run for 15K iterations with perturbation budget $\epsilon = 8/255$, unless noted otherwise; ablations across perturbation budgets are deferred to Appendix A. We evaluate six production VLMs: GPT 5.4 [43] (for ChatGPT we use the thinking mode), Gemini 3.1 Pro [17], Claude Opus 4.6 [4], Grok 4.2 [61], Qwen 3.6 Plus [48], and Llama 4 Maverick [36]. We also evaluate the version of Grok used as an AI assistant on 𝕏 [60]; we refer to this version simply as "Grok". For image generation, we use GPT 5.4 Image 2 [42], Nano Banana 2 [18] (and it's API counterpart Gemini 3 Pro Image Preview), and Grok-Imagine-Image-Pro.

For all attacks, we manually select suitable source and target images following the oracle attack blueprint in Section 4.1. We further discuss constraints on target selection and image-level factors affecting attack success in Section 6.1. The case studies were chosen to illustrate the range of attack outcomes adversarial examples can produce against deployed VLMs, rather than to highlight only successful attacks against carefully chosen targets.

Our examples are not cherry-picked: we also report quantitative results across multiple source-target pairs for several case studies. All model responses shown in the paper are verbatim outputs from the original user prompt; we do not edit, truncate, or paraphrase model responses except where explicitly noted.

5.1 Narrative Manipulation

Social media platforms have become a primary source of news in recent years. This shift has made the spread of misinformation a critical concern. Platforms thus increasingly deploy tools (such as community notes, verification chatbots, etc.) to provide more authoritative and trustworthy information. We show how adversarial examples can weaponize and misplace this trust.

Case study 1: Amplifying conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theorists have long cast doubt on the Apollo 11 moon landing, claiming that NASA fabricated the released images. Figure 1 shows how adversarial manipulation of the iconic moon landing photograph causes ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking to validate these claims: when the image is perturbed to match the text embedding of "fake news", the model confirms to the user that the image is fake, directly supporting conspiracy-theory propagation. Figure 3 shows another



Figure 3: ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking declares the 9/11 attacks to be fabricated, echoing long-standing conspiracies that the attacks were staged or orchestrated. The image is adversarially manipulated to match the text embedding of "fake news".

example targeting a similarly infamous conspiracy theory: a photograph of the September 11 attacks is perturbed using the same text target, and ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking again declares the event fake. The model's response echoes long-standing "9/11 truther" narratives that the attacks were staged or orchestrated.

Quantitative analysis. We extend this evaluation to six additional photographs of well-documented historical events: the atomic bombings of Japan; the selection of Hungarian Jews at the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp; the assassination attempt on Donald Trump during a 2024 campaign rally; the assassination of John F. Kennedy; the state funeral of Shinzo Abe; and the official surrender of Japan in 1945. We present the adversarial versions of these images, manipulated to match the embedding of the text "fake news", in Figure 21 in the appendix, yielding a total of eight adversarial images (including the Apollo 11 and 9/11 images from Figures 1 and 3). Table 1 reports the results of asking six VLMs to verify the authenticity of these images. To account for non-determinism, we repeat each query five times and report the average attack success rate, where success is defined as the model identifying the depicted event as fake. Responses are automatically classified as successes or failures using GPT-4o-mini. All models except Claude Opus 4.6 are fooled in the majority of cases. Moreover, for seven of the eight images, all models are fooled in at least one of the five trials.

Conspiracies beyond historical events. Beyond contesting the veracity of world events, VLMs can amplify other conspiracies by providing authoritative statements. As an example, in Figure 4), we ask Grok whether Tylenol (a widely used pain reliever and fever reliever) is safe to use during pregnancy. Although the medical consensus on the topic is that Tylenol can be used safely during pregnancy, Grok seems to parrot the common conspiracy claims linking it to autism and ADHD. The reason is simple: Grok does not "see" Tylenol because the picture is an adversarial example that targets the embedding of an image of *Roaccutane*, a medication against severe acne that is contraindicated during pregnancy due to its association with major birth defects and high rates of miscarriage.

Table 1: Attack success rates on eight adversarially perturbed photographs of well-documented historical events, each perturbed to match the text embedding of "fake news," averaged over five runs per image. Success indicates the model classifies the perturbed image as fake.

Model	Average ASR
Llama 4 Maverick	67.5%
Qwen 3.6 Plus	47.5%
Gemini 3 Pro Image Preview	100.0%
Grok 4.2	97.5%
GPT 5.4	67.5%
Claude Opus 4.6	37.5%

Figure 4: Grok 4.2 amplifies conspiracies about Tylenol (a common pain reliever considered safe during pregnancy) by warning the user that the medication can cause severe birth defects. The image is adversarially manipulated to match the embedding of an image of Roaccutane, an acne medication contraindicated during pregnancy.

Empirically, we found that source images that contain prominent text elements (such as the Tylenol box here) are harder to turn into successful adversarial examples, presumably due to the VLM's strong OCR abilities. We thus increase the perturbation budget to $\epsilon = 32/255$ for this attacks. We further discuss the limitations of text-heavy images in Section 6.1.

Case study 2: Delivering unsafe advice. Beyond news and product recommendations, social media platforms host daily advice and personal experience reports that AI assistants increasingly endorse or summarize. The endorsement of an AI authority can lend false credibility to dangerous content, with potentially severe consequences in safety-critical domains such as medicine and food.

Figure 1 shows the response of ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking for an image of actual Roaccutane medication (which we recall is unsafe during pregnancy). The image is perturbed to match the embedding of Natalben, a prenatal supplement, with a perturbation budget of $\epsilon = 32/255$. The model declares that the medication is safe to take during pregnancy. The same attack succeeds against five other models we evaluated— Claude Opus 4.6, GPT 5.4, Grok 4.2, Qwen 3.6 Plus, and Llama 4 Maverick—each declaring Roaccutane as safe in each of five repeated queries. Only Gemini 3.1 Pro recognized the image as Roaccutane and correctly issued a warning.

We provide two related examples in the appendix, see Appendix E. Figure 18 shows an attack where a user describes their experience foraging mushrooms and recommends that others do the same. The attached image shows *Amanita phalloides*, the "death cap" (one of the world's most poisonous mushrooms, responsible for the majority of fatal mushroom poisonings worldwide). This image is perturbed to mimic *Pleurotus ostreatus*, the popular edible oyster mushroom. When another user asks Grok to confirm the recommendation, Grok responds affirmatively. In a similar example in Figure 17, Grok recommends eating a highly poisonous type of fish, and goes as far as providing a recommended recipe.

> **Takeaway 1:** Adversarial perturbations cause production VLMs to confidently make false claims about images, lending AI authority to conspiracy theories, contested narratives, and dangerous advice. This can amplify the reach and credibility of misinformation, with consequences ranging from public confusion to direct physical harm.

5.2 Disparaging Individuals

We show that adversarial examples enable reputation attacks by causing VLMs to misidentify the people depicted in images. Unlike deepfakes, which generate synthetic content, these perturbations leave the original visual content near-intact, and instead corrupt only the model's interpretation. The resulting misidentifications can implicate innocent people in crimes, spread misinformation about public figures, and propagate through downstream tasks such as image generation and search.

Case study 3: Identity manipulation. In Figure 5, we present Grok 4.2 with two images: one of Elon Musk and one of Cristiano Ronaldo, with Ronaldo's image perturbed to target an overweight individual. When asked "who is in better shape," Grok 4.2 selects Musk without hesitation, citing his "leaner physique".

This example is a relatively low-stakes instance of identity manipulation (it could nevertheless cause reputation harm for a model like Grok by insinuating strong biases). However, misidentification can have far more serious consequences, such as reputation damage when public figures are associated with fabricated allegations. To illustrate, in Figure 6 we provide Grok with a screenshot of a news article reporting an arrest for drug dealing, altered to match the embedding of an image of Elon Musk. When asked who the article discusses, Grok identifies Musk.

We find that the success rate of identity manipulation attacks such as the one in Figure 6 differs widely between the models we evaluated. In one extreme, Grok 4.2 and Qwen 3.6 Plus always identify Elon Musk 5/5 times. On the other extreme, the attack is inconsequential against GPT 5.4 and Claude Opus 4.6, as both models



Figure 5: Grok 4.2 identifies Elon Musk as being in better shape than Cristiano Ronaldo, citing the former's "leaner physique." Ronaldo's photograph is adversarially perturbed to match the embedding of an overweight individual.



Figure 6: Grok misidentifies Musk as the subject of a news article reporting an arrest for drug dealing, because the screenshot was perturbed to target an image of Elon Musk.

decline to identify individuals in any images. For Gemini 3.1 Pro and Llama 4 Maverick, the attack fails to identify Musk, but the models also fail to recognize the true subject of the article.

When we repeat the experiment for a second news article that explicitly names the correct individual in its title, the attack is even more effective: all models except Llama 4 Maverick identify Musk in every attempt, despite the contradictory text. The complete results appear in Appendix E.

In both experiments, the perturbation was applied to the entire news article screenshot rather than solely to the embedded photograph; this is necessary as otherwise the VLM might correctly read the article text, thereby bypassing the visual content entirely. We discuss this behavior further in Section 6.1.

Quantitative analysis. To enable a systematic evaluation of identity manipulation, we perform cross-identity attacks for ten public figures: Elon Musk, Beyoncé, Deepika Padukone, Donald Trump, Jackie Chan, Kanye West, Samuel L. Jackson, Shah Rukh Khan, Shakira, and Taylor Swift. For each identity, we construct nine adversarial images by perturbing its photograph to match the embedding of each of the other nine. This yields a total of $10 \times 9 = 90$ adversarial images. We evaluated four models (Grok 4.2, Qwen 3.6 Plus, Llama 4 Maverick, and Gemini 3.1 Pro) and prompted each to identify the person depicted (Claude Opus 4.6 and GPT 5.4 are excluded since they refuse to identify individuals in images). We report two success metrics: *targeted success*, the rate at which the model identifies the intended target, and *untargeted success*, the rate at which the model fails to identify the correct source.

Table 2 reports the results. The four models fail to identify the source identity in 84% to 96% of cases. Targeted attack success rates are lower, but remain notable: Grok 4.2, the most susceptible model,

Table 2: Attack success rates for cross-identity manipulation for images of ten public figures and $10 \times 9 = 90$ adversarial pairings. Targeted ASR is the rate at which the model identifies the intended target; untargeted ASR is the rate at which it fails to identify the source. Claude and GPT models are excluded as they refuse to identify individuals in images.

	ASR	
Model	**Targeted**	**Untargeted**
Qwen 3.6 Plus	48.9%	87.8%
Llama 4 Maverick	35.6%	95.6%
Grok 4.2	54.4%	95.6%
Gemini 3.1 Pro	22.2%	84.4%

identifies the intended target in 54.4% of cases. This gap shows that obscuring an identity is substantially easier than redirecting recognition to a chosen one. Success rates also vary substantially depending on shared attributes (e.g., gender and race) between the source and target. We break down this effect, as well as the impact of the perturbation budget ϵ and the number of optimization steps in Appendices C and D.

Manipulated identities transfer to downstream tasks. Identity manipulation can also affect downstream vision tasks, such as image generation and editing, or reverse image search.

Figure 1 (bottom left) illustrated an attack in this setting: we give Grok a benign image of Musk alongside an image of the serial killer Ted Bundy, perturbed to target an AI generated individual. When tasked to generate an image depicting the arrest of "the guiltier person," Grok selects Musk, as it no longer recognizes Bundy in the perturbed image. Adversarial identity manipulation thus propagates through multi-step pipelines, not just recognition queries.

In Appendix E, we explore further downstream effects on reverse image search in common search engines such as Google, Yandex,

and Bing. Figure 16 shows that an image of Donald Trump perturbed to match Elon Musk causes Google reverse image search to return results about Musk. Similarly, Google, Yandex, and Bing all return generic results when queried for the perturbed image of Ted Bundy from Figure 1. A notable consequence is that providing VLM agents with the ability to search the web is unlikely to prevent identity manipulation attacks, since the search results themselves are corrupted by the same perturbation.

> **Takeaway 2:** Adversarial perturbations can trick production VLMs into misidentifying public figures in images, redirecting recognition to an attacker-chosen target. This propagates through downstream tasks such as image generation and reverse image search, enabling reputation attacks and false attributions that carry the AI's authority.

5.3 Evading Content Moderation

VLMs are routinely asked to process or generate inappropriate content. Their internal safety training thus becomes part of a platform's content moderation pipeline, along with traditional content filters. VLMs typically first reason about the safety of a task before deciding to complete it. By tricking the VLM into accepting an inappropriate task, we can launder the AI's authority in the content moderation pipeline, and counteract signals coming from additional filters. We show that adversarial examples can achieve this.

Case study 4: Evading NSFW detectors. We select 10 explicit images depicting nudity, each flagged as pornographic with high confidence by two commercial NSFW detection services: NSFW Check[1] (99.5% average confidence) and Nyckel[2] (98.4% average confidence). When submitted to three image-generation VLMs (Nano Banana Pro, GPT 5.4 Image 2, and Grok-Imagine-Image-Pro) with the request "generate a cartoon-style version of this image", all three models refuse every image, citing content-policy violations.

We then perturb each image to match the embedding of an image of a toy, repeating the process for five different images of dolls and five different images of teddy bears, for a total of 100 perturbed images. Neither of the commercial NSFW detection service flags the perturbed images: both classify them as *Neutral*, with average confidence of 91.8% and 90.7%, respectively. Furthermore, when prompted to assess whether these images would be appropriate content to post on social media, ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking responds affirmatively, citing their "high engagement potential", see Figure 1.

We submit these adversarial examples to the same image generation VLMs as above, which now accept the editing task with high probability (see Table 3). We manually verified that the generated cartoon images retain the explicit content of the original source, demonstrating complete evasion of both the models' own safety guardrails and any other content filters. Figure 7 presents one example of an attack, where a NSFW source image is perturbed towards a target image of a doll, which then results in the generation of cartoon-style nudity. Images have been censored to ensure appropriate academic presentation.

[1]https://nsfwai.org/nsfw-check
[2]https://www.nyckel.com/pretrained-classifiers/nsfw-identifier/



Figure 7: Bypassing NSFW filters via adversarial perturbation. An explicit source image is perturbed to match the embedding of a doll. Two commercial NSFW classifiers no longer flag the perturbed image as inappropriate, and three image-generation VLMs accept a request to "generate a cartoon-style version of this image," producing outputs that retain the explicit content of the source. Sensitive imagery has been censored to ensure appropriate academic presentation.

Table 3: Acceptance rates for image-generation requests ("generate a cartoon-style version of this image") on adversarially perturbed NSFW source images. Each model is evaluated on 100 perturbed images: 10 source NSFW images perturbed toward each of 5 doll targets and each of 5 teddy bear targets.

	ASR per target	
Model	Doll	Teddy Bear
Grok-Imagine-Image-Pro	100.0%	84.0%
GPT 5.4 Image 2	96.0%	92.0%
Gemini 3 Pro Image Preview	94.0%	70.0%

Case study 5: Exploiting asymmetric content policies. In the previous case-study, we evaded a universal content policy (models should not process or generate nudity). We now consider contextual content policies, which we show are very well suited for our attacks.

In many cases, attempts to evade content moderation apply more strongly to some types of inputs than others. As an example, after Grok was prompted to generate millions of sexual deepfakes — primarily of women — in late 2025 [54], the platform 𝕏 introduced stronger content moderation specifically for edits of images of women and female celebrities. As a result, we find that Grok now seemingly accepts requests to remove clothing from images of male subjects, but reliably rejects identical requests for female subjects.

Adversarial perturbations can exploit this asymmetry: by perturbing an image of a woman to match the embedding of a male, the



Figure 8: Adversarial bypass of gender-asymmetric content moderation in Grok. Left: a clothing-removal request on a male image is accepted. Middle: the same request on a female image is rejected by a moderation policy. Right: Grok accepts the request when the female image is perturbed to match the embedding of the male image. The resulting edit retains the original female subject. Images have been censored to ensure appropriate academic presentation.

attack tricks Grok into accepting edit requests it would otherwise reject. Figure 8 presents an example of this attack for Grok 4.2: the model originally refuses the edit request for the female image but complies with the same request for the slightly perturbed version.

We quantify this effect via a systematic evaluation with 20 AI-generated images of men and women, and all $10 \times 10 = 100$ adversarial images oof each woman as a source targeting of the male images. Table 4 reports the evasion results. Grok-Imagine-Image-Pro accepts all clothing-removal requests for male images and rejects all identical requests for unperturbed female images. However, for perturbed female images, 81% of requests are accepted, so the perturbation reliably circumvented the gender-specific content filter. We manually verified (over a random 15% subsample of the generated images) that the model is indeed editing the original female subject rather than substituting in the male target.

Table 4: Adversarial bypass of asymmetric content moderation policies. Case Study 5 targets gender-asymmetric clothing removal, with female images perturbed toward male targets. Case Study 6 targets public-figure protection, with images of public figures perturbed toward AI-generated faces. ASR measures acceptance rates for the unperturbed target, unperturbed source, and perturbed source images.

		ASR		
Case Study	**Model**	Target	Source	Adv.
5 - Asymmetric gender policy	Grok Imagine Image Pro	100%	0%	81%
6 - Public figure protection	Gemini 3 Image Preview	100%	0%	86%

Case study 6: Evading public-figure protections. Not all content moderation systems correspond to NSFW or violent content. Nano Banana Pro, for example, refuses to generate or edit images of public figures: when asked to modify an image of Elon Musk to depict him smoking a cigar by a pool, or an image of the Puerto Rican musician Bad Bunny to depict him looking drunk, the model refuses. After perturbing both images to match the embeddings of an AI-generated person, the model no longer recognizes a public figure and fulfills the request, see Figures 1 and 9.



Figure 9: Some VLMs, such as Nano Banana Pro, refuse image editing or generation requests targeting public figures (top). After perturbing an image of Elon Musk to target the embedding of an AI generated person, the model no longer recognizes Musk and agrees to the request (bottom).

Quantitative analysis. We expand this evaluation to 10 photographs of public figures (Elon Musk, Bad Bunny, Barack Obama,

Beyoncé, Donald Trump, Jackie Chan, Kim Jong Un, Mark Zuckerberg, Taylor Swift, and Shakira), 10 AI-generated faces, and all $10 \times 10 = 100$ adversarial images produced by perturbing each public-figure photograph to target each AI-generated face. For every adversarial example, we ask Gemini 3 Pro Image Preview (the API equivalent of Nano Banana Pro) to "generate a new image of the person smoking a cigar by a pool." Table 4 reports the results. All requests for AI-generated faces are accepted, all requests for unperturbed public figures are rejected, and 86% of the adversarial images bypass the public-figure restriction.

From manual inspection of a random 15% sample, we estimate that the majority of generated images perfectly depict the intended public figure. In other cases, some facial features are altered and the image merely resembles the public figure without exactly depicting them. This is not a property of the source identity: for a given public figure, some targets yield exact outputs, while others yield only a resemblance. We show examples in Figure 22 in the appendix.

Why do these attacks work? Given that our adversarial perturbations make the VLM perceive the wrong input, we may wonder why the model's *output* reflects the original source rather than the target. The above results, together with those in Figure 8, suggest an architectural asymmetry within the VLM pipeline. The adversarial perturbation shifts the image's embedding toward the target while leaving its visible content essentially unchanged. The content-moderation pathway likely depends on the input embedding, and therefore perceives the adversarial target (an AI-generated face, or a male subject) and permits the request. The image generator component, however, produces an output that reflects the visible content of the source input rather than of the target, yielding an image of the original subject (the public figure, or the female subject). Our adversarial examples thus appear to affect what the model *perceives and decides to do* but not what it *outputs*.

> **Takeaway 3:** Adversarial perturbations bypass content moderation systems that rely on VLM perception, including NSFW detectors, gender-asymmetric editing filters, and public-figure protections. Disallowed content can then circulate under the AI's implicit approval, undermining platform policies and safeguards.

5.4 Commercial Manipulation

AI assistants are increasingly used to provide product recommendations and purchasing advice. Adversarial examples can manipulate these recommendations, to inflate the perceived value of an attacker's product or to sabotage a competitor's—thereby compromising consumer trust in AI-mediated purchasing decisions.

Case study 7: Fake product recommendations. Consider an attacker selling a low-quality product who seeks to inflate its ranking against stronger competitors. To illustrate, in Figure 10 we present ChatGPT with images of two watches: one from an affordable entry-level brand (retail price $50) while the other is a Casio G-Shock watch, a well-known high quality brand (retail price $440). Without perturbation, ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking and all other evaluated models recommend the more valuable G-Shock when asked for purchasing advice. Yet, after perturbing the image of the cheaper watch to match the embedding of a Rolex Submariner (retail price $10,000) all models reverse their recommendation and select the cheaper watch instead. Figure 10 presents ChatGPT's response when presented with the perturbed version. We show a similar experiment in Appendix E, in which an image of worn-out shoes is perturbed so that Grok recommends them over brand-new alternatives. These experiments demonstrate the ease with which an attacker can subtly manipulate AI-powered recommendation systems to favor their product over higher-quality or more suitable products.



Figure 10: Presented with images of two watches, a high-end Casio G-Shock and a simpler entry-level watch perturbed to match the embedding of a Rolex, ChatGPT recommends purchasing the perturbed watch.

Attacks against browser agents. Next, we evaluate a realistic deployment scenario involving a browser agent, ChatGPT Atlas [40]. We present the VLM with a screenshot of top search results for the query "smart watch" on Amazon, and ask it to recommend one. To simulate an adversarial seller, we replace one product's image with that of a candy watch perturbed to match the embedding of an Apple Watch (Figure 1). ChatGPT Atlas recommends the manipulated product, describing it as "more premium" than its competitors.

Sabotaging competitors. Adversarial perturbations can also be used to sabotage a competitor's product rather than promote the attacker's own. We present all six evaluated VLMs with two smartwatch images: a Samsung Galaxy Watch 8 (retail price $280) and an Apple Watch Series 11 (retail price $400). Without perturbation, every model recommends the Apple Watch. When the Apple Watch image is perturbed to match the embedding of a toy candy watch using only $\epsilon = 4/255$, most models reverse , see Figure 20 in the appendix for ChatGPT's response.

Takeaway 4: VLM-mediated purchasing decisions can be steered by adversarial sellers, to promote inferior products or sabotage competitors. This compromises the trust users place in AI shopping assistants and exposes a new attack surface for fraud in AI-mediated commerce.

6 Discussion

6.1 Limitations and Failure Cases

Our experiments in Section 5 have demonstrated that adversarial examples can be used for successful AI authority laundering in a diverse range of settings. Nevertheless, these attacks are not foolproof and sometimes require careful choices of sources, targets, and possibly prompts to be most effective. Here, we discuss some notable limitations and failure cases of our attack approach, and illustrate them with examples from our prior case studies.

Verbose model outputs can reveal a perception discrepancy. Models vary in their level of verbosity. When responses or reasoning traces include details beyond what was strictly asked, they can leak information about the target content and expose the attack to an attentive user. Figure 19 shows one example: an image of a pair of worn-out, brandless shoes is perturbed toward an image of Nike Air Jordans, and Grok's response explicitly names Air Jordans when recommending the perturbed shoes, which may alert the user to the attack. The attacker may be able to minimize this leakage by choosing more specific or narrower prompts. For example, given the perturbed Tylenol image of Figure 4 along with the open-ended prompt "Is this safe to take during pregnancy? Can it harm the baby?," Grok 4.2 answers "*No, this is not safe to take during pregnancy. It can cause severe harm to the baby,*" but then continues with a long explanation that explicitly mentions Roaccutane. If the prompt adds the constraint that the model should "answer in a single sentence", the attacker can eliminate the Roaccutane-related explanation while preserving the (incorrect) safety verdict.

Models are sensitive to text in source images. Adversarial perturbations are less effective when images contain highly visible text, likely because many VLMs have robust OCR capabilities. For example, if we perturb only the photograph in the news-article screenshots in Figures 6 and 15 and leave the text untouched, the attack fails for all evaluated models. However, the attack succeeds when the perturbation is applied to the entire screenshot, including the text regions. Even then, the attack fails if the prompt specifically directs the model's attention to the text, e.g., if we ask "what does this article say about the person?", the model does correctly read the source headline and reports the correct identity after retrieving the full article via web search. A similar issue affects the images of drug packages in Figures 1 and 4: overcoming the model's OCR pathway requires a substantially larger perturbation budget ($\epsilon = 32/255$ in our experiments, compared to $8/255$ for typical natural images), and even then the model often surfaces the original text in its response, as observed in the preceding paragraph on output transparency.

Our attacks are not fully imperceptible. Even with low ℓ_∞ noise (e.g., $\epsilon = 4$ or $\epsilon = 8$), attacks against CLIP models tend to produce some perceptual features, which can be apparent for high-resolution inputs. In part, this may explain why these perturbations transfer so well. But it also means that some attacks could be detected by attentive users. This does not necessarily invalidate the attack. Even if only some fraction of users are fooled, the attacker's goal could still be reached (some users purchase an inferior product, or misinformation fools some users and spreads before it is counteracted[3]).

Beyond capping the ℓ_∞ norm, we take no measures to minimize the detectability of adversarial perturbations. Adding additional perceptual losses to the optimization objective [68] or selecting more aligned sources and targets (e.g., humans with similar poses) could further reduce the visibility of perturbations [16].

6.2 Defenses

Adversarial robustness for neural networks, including VLMs, has been an active research area for more than a decade. Proposed defenses are rapidly broken by adaptive attacks, or only defend against a narrow set of attacks (see Appendix B for a detailed discussion). Current VLMs remain vulnerable to the same basic transfer attack techniques as ten years ago, and our thesis is that this will not change in the near future. Defenses aimed primarily at preventing *the transferability* of attacks are another possible avenue [25], but they have proved similarly fruitless so far. Moreover, even if a defense does succeed in making a model robust to, say, 95% of attack attempts, an attacker could simply try multiple attack variants (e.g., with different sources and targets) and validate them out-of-band using a model API or private social media account.

However, this need not mean that the *systems* we build with VLMs cannot be made more robust. This could be achieved, for instance, by encouraging VLMs to explicitly verbalize their reasoning. As discussed in Section 6.1 above, this can make it easier for users to detect attempts to launder epistemic AI authority. A hypothetical solution that addresses image authenticity issues in a more general way could come from developments in cryptographic image integrity checks [15, 19, 38], which tie an image to the hardware that captured it (e.g., a phone camera).

However, in the current landscape, it may be necessary to fundamentally reconsider the authority that is implicitly or explicitly granted to VLM outputs on online platforms. If attacks such as the ones we present here start appearing in the wild, it may be necessary to limit the reach of VLM outputs on online platforms (e.g., on 𝕏), or flag them as potentially malicious or misleading.

7 Conclusion

For more than a decade, adversarial examples have largely remained an academic curiosity, with little impact on real-world AI security. Our work demonstrates that this era may have ended. Vision-language models that are being deployed today as trusted authorities in online ecosystems elevate adversarial examples into practical attack vectors for spreading misinformation and unwanted content.

Consequences for platform operators and policymakers. Deploying VLMs as authorities creates new attack surfaces demanding both technical interventions (e.g., defense-in-depth, exposed reasoning traces) and policy responses (e.g, transparency about limitations). As VLMs become gatekeepers of online information and commerce,

[3] "A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes". (Incorrectly) attributed to Mark Twain.

the authority we grant AI systems must be calibrated to their actual robustness, not their apparent sophistication.

Online platforms that integrate AI authorities should therefore consider ways to limit the spread of AI-endorsed misinformation, such as limiting the reach of VLM outputs or clearly tagging them as potentially manipulated. An alternative direction to consider is to deploy mechanisms that help in disseminating *retractions* of false AI claims once they have been discovered.

Consequences for users. Some users might already over-trust AI authorities despite their propensity for hallucinations, mistakes, and biases. However, these sources of error have also improved drastically in recent times, giving AI authorities further credibility, which our attacks can undermine. Our results thus call for increased skepticism when encountering AI-mediated content, particularly when images are involved. While we have attempted to target small perturbation budgets in this work, we made no particular effort to make the attacks stealthier, e.g., by selecting sources and target that "blend in" with each other, or by experimenting with alternative perceptual metrics than the standard ℓ_∞ norm. As a result, it is likely that our attacks could also be achieved with perturbations that are even less perceptible and thus harder to catch.

Consequences for the adversarial ML research community. Our results show that adversarial examples can indeed be realistic and practical safety concerns for deployed AI systems. We believe that this calls for a focus shift from research targeting standalone models to attacks and defenses that take into account the constraints of the real-world ecosystems that incorporate these models. In particular, specific properties of real AI systems may provide avenues for building pragmatic defenses without having to solve the incredibly challenging underlying root cause of visual adversarial robustness.

8 Acknowledgment

J.Z. is funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) project grant 214838. A.S. is partially funded by Schmidt Sciences. We sincerely thank Roei Schuster for his valuable feedback and Jiaqi Li for his help with the medicine example.

9 Responsible Disclosure.

We disclosed our findings to xAI, the operator of the most prominent affected deployment (Grok on 𝕏), through their public security-disclosure channel on February 3rd, 2026, offering a two-month embargo window, and have received no response. We believe the scientific and security benefits of disclosure outweigh the risks of suppression, particularly given that these vulnerabilities likely exist regardless of our work and that transparency is necessary to drive defensive research.

References

[1] Naveed Akhtar and Ajmal Mian. 2018. Threat of adversarial attacks on deep learning in computer vision: A survey. *IEEE Access* 6 (2018), 14410–14430. doi:10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2807385

[2] Naveed Akhtar, Ajmal Mian, Navid Kardan, and Mubarak Shah. 2021. Advances in adversarial attacks and defenses in computer vision: A survey. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2108.00401* (2021). https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.00401

[3] Nouar AlDahoul, Talal Rahwan, and Yasir Zaki. 2025. AI-generated faces influence gender stereotypes and racial homogenization. *Scientific Reports* 15, 14449 (2025). doi:10.1038/s41598-025-99623-3

[4] Anthropic. 2026. Introducing Claude Opus 4.6. https://www.anthropic.com/news/claude-opus-4-6. Published: 2026-02-05.

[5] Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner. 2018. Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*. 274–283.

[6] Eugene Bagdasaryan, Tsung-Yin Hsieh, Ben Nassi, and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2023. Abusing images and sounds for indirect instruction injection in multi-modal LLMs. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.10490* (2023).

[7] Eugene Bagdasaryan and Vitaly Shmatikov. 2022. Spinning Language Models: Risks of Propaganda-As-A-Service and Countermeasures. In *2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*. IEEE, 769–786. doi:10.1109/sp46214.2022.9833572

[8] Luke Bailey, Euan Ong, Stuart Russell, and Scott Emmons. 2023. Image hijacks: Adversarial images can control generative models at runtime. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.00236* (2023).

[9] Battista Biggio, Blaine Nelson, and Pavel Laskov. 2012. Poisoning attacks against support vector machines. In *Proceedings of the 29th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)*. 1807–1814. https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.6389

[10] Nicholas Carlini. 2021. Adversarial Attacks That Matter. Presentation at ICCV Workshop on Adversarial Robustness in the Real World (AROW). https://nicholas.carlini.com/slides/2021_attacks_that_matter.pdf

[11] Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr, Christopher A Choquette-Choo, Matthew Jagielski, Irena Gao, Pang Wei W Koh, Daphne Ippolito, Florian Tramèr, and Ludwig Schmidt. 2023. Are aligned neural networks adversarially aligned? *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems* 36 (2023), 61478–61500.

[12] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. 2017. Adversarial examples are not easily detected: Bypassing ten detection methods. In *ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security*. 3–14.

[13] Jeremy Cohen, Elan Rosenfeld, and Zico Kolter. 2019. Certified adversarial robustness via randomized smoothing. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*. 1310–1320.

[14] Xuanming Cui, Alejandro Aparcedo, Young Kyun Jang, and Ser-Nam Lim. 2024. On the robustness of large multimodal models against image adversarial attacks. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*. 24625–24634.

[15] Trisha Datta, Binyi Chen, and Dan Boneh. 2025. VerITAS: Verifying image transformations at scale. In *2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*. IEEE, 4606–4623.

[16] Debayan Deb, Jianbang Zhang, and Anil K Jain. 2020. Advfaces: Adversarial face synthesis. In *2020 IEEE International Joint Conference on Biometrics (IJCB)*. IEEE, 1–10.

[17] Google DeepMind. 2026. Gemini 3.1 Pro: A smarter model for your most complex tasks. https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/models-and-research/gemini-models/gemini-3-1-pro/. Published: 2026-02-19.

[18] Google DeepMind. 2026. Nano Banana 2: Combining Pro capabilities with lightning-fast speed. https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/technology/ai/nano-banana-2/. Published: 2026-02-26.

[19] Pierpaolo Della Monica, Ivan Visconti, Andrea Vitaletti, and Marco Zecchini. 2025. Trust nobody: Privacy-preserving proofs for edited photos with your laptop. In *2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*. IEEE, 4624–4642.

[20] Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Brandon Tran, and Aleksander Madry. 2019. Adversarial robustness as a prior for learned representations. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.00945* (2019).

[21] Kevin Eykholt, Ivan Evtimov, Earlence Fernandes, Bo Li, Amir Rahmati, Chaowei Xiao, Atul Prakash, Tadayoshi Kohno, and Dawn Song. 2018. Robust physical-world attacks on deep learning visual classification. In *Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition*. 1625–1634.

[22] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. 2014. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572* (2014).

[23] Isha Gupta, Rylan Schaeffer, Joshua Kazdan, Ken Ziyu Liu, and Sanmi Koyejo. 2025. Understanding Adversarial Transfer: Why Representation-Space Attacks Fail Where Data-Space Attacks Succeed. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.01494* (2025).

[24] Hongliang He, Wenlin Yao, Kaixin Ma, Wenhao Yu, Yong Dai, Hongming Zhang, Zhenzhong Lan, and Dong Yu. 2024. WebVoyager: Building an End-to-End Web Agent with Large Multimodal Models. In *Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*. https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.13919

[25] Hossein Hosseini, Yize Chen, Sreeram Kannan, Baosen Zhang, and Radha Poovendran. 2017. Blocking transferability of adversarial examples in black-box learning systems. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.04318* (2017).

[26] Kai Hu, Weichen Yu, Li Zhang, Alexander Robey, Andy Zou, Chengming Xu, Haoqi Hu, and Matt Fredrikson. 2025. Transferable adversarial attacks on black-box vision-language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.01050* (2025).

[27] Lei Huang, Weijiang Yu, Weitao Ma, Weihong Zhong, Zhangyin Feng, Haotian Wang, Qianglong Chen, Weihua Peng, Xiaocheng Feng, Bing Qin, et al. 2024. A Survey on Hallucination in Large Language Models: Principles, Taxonomy, Challenges, and Open Questions. *ACM Transactions on Information Systems* (2024). https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3703155

[28] Andrew Ilyas, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Logan Engstrom, Brandon Tran, and Aleksander Madry. 2019. Adversarial examples are not bugs, they are features. *Advances in neural information processing systems* 32 (2019).

[29] Aounon Kumar, Alexander Levine, Tom Goldstein, and Soheil Feizi. 2023. Rethinking Randomized Smoothing from the Perspective of Scalability. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.12608* (2023). https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.12608

[30] Walter Laurito, Benjamin Davis, Peli Grietzer, Tomáš Gavenčiak, Ada Böhm, and Jan Kulveit. 2025. AI–AI bias: Large language models favor communications generated by large language models. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 122, 31 (2025), e2415697122.

[31] Yifan Li, Yifan Du, Kun Zhou, Jinpeng Wang, Xin Zhao, and Ji-Rong Wen. 2023. Evaluating object hallucination in large vision-language models. In *Proceedings of the 2023 conference on empirical methods in natural language processing*. 292–305.

[32] Zhaoyi Li, Xiaohan Zhao, Dong-Dong Wu, Jiacheng Cui, and Zhiqiang Shen. 2025. A Frustratingly Simple Yet Highly Effective Attack Baseline: Over 90% Success Rate Against the Strong Black-box Models of GPT-4.5/4o/o1. In *The Thirty-ninth Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems*. https://openreview.net/forum?id=9xXjWwAoUF

[33] Yanpei Liu, Xinyun Chen, Chang Liu, and Dawn Song. 2017. Delving into Transferable Adversarial Examples and Black-box Attacks. arXiv:1611.02770 [cs.LG] https://arxiv.org/abs/1611.02770

[34] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu. 2018. Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*.

[35] Ninareh Mehrabi. 2023. Fairness and Bias in Artificial Intelligence: A Brief Survey of Sources, Impacts, and Mitigation Strategies. *Journal of MDPI* 6, 1 (2023). https://www.mdpi.com/2413-4155/6/1/3

[36] Meta. 2025. The Llama 4 herd: The beginning of a new era of natively multimodal AI innovation. https://ai.meta.com/blog/llama-4-multimodal-intelligence. Published: 2025-04-05.

[37] Ben Nassi, Yisroel Mirsky, Dudi Nassi, Raz Ben-Netanel, Oleg Drokin, and Yuval Elovici. 2020. Phantom of the adas: Securing advanced driver-assistance systems from split-second phantom attacks. In *Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC conference on computer and communications security*. 293–308.

[38] Assa Naveh and Eran Tromer. 2016. Photoproof: Cryptographic image authentication for any set of permissible transformations. In *2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*. IEEE, 255–271.

[39] Catherine Olsson. 2019. Unsolved Research Problems vs. Real-World Threat Models. Medium. https://medium.com/@catherio/unsolved-research-problems-vs-real-world-threat-models-e270e256bc9e

[40] OpenAI. 2025. Introducing ChatGPT Atlas. OpenAI Blog. https://openai.com/index/introducing-chatgpt-atlas/ Published: 2025-10-21.

[41] OpenAI. 2025. Introducing Operator. OpenAI Blog. https://openai.com/index/introducing-operator/

[42] OpenAI. 2026. Introducing ChatGPT Images 2.0. OpenAI Blog. https://openai.com/index/introducing-chatgpt-images-2-0/ Published: 2026-04-21.

[43] OpenAI. 2026. Introducing GPT-5.4. OpenAI Blog. https://openai.com/index/introducing-gpt-5-4/ Published: 2026-03-05.

[44] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, and Ian Goodfellow. 2016. Transferability in machine learning: from phenomena to black-box attacks using adversarial samples. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.07277* (2016).

[45] Ethan Perez, Saffron Huang, Francis Song, Trevor Cai, Roman Ring, John Aslanides, Amelia Glaese, Nat McAleese, and Geoffrey Irving. 2022. Red teaming language models with language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2202.03286* (2022).

[46] Jonathan Prokos, Neil Fendley, Matthew Green, Roei Schuster, Eran Tromer, Tushar Jois, and Yinzhi Cao. 2023. Squint hard enough: Attacking perceptual hashing with adversarial machine learning. In *32nd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 23)*. 211–228.

[47] Xiangyu Qi, Kaixuan Huang, Ashwinee Panda, Peter Henderson, Mengdi Wang, and Prateek Mittal. 2024. Visual adversarial examples jailbreak aligned large language models. In *Proceedings of the AAAI conference on artificial intelligence*, Vol. 38. 21527–21536.

[48] Qwen. 2026. Qwen3.6-Plus: Towards Real World Agents. https://qwen.ai/blog?id=qwen3.6. Published: 2026-04-01.

[49] Javier Rando, Hannah Korevaar, Erik Brinkman, Ivan Evtimov, and Florian Tramèr. 2024. Gradient-based jailbreak images for multimodal fusion models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.03489* (2024).

[50] Rylan Schaeffer, Dan Valentine, Luke Bailey, James Chua, Cristobal Eyzaguirre, Zane Durante, Joe Benton, Brando Miranda, Henry Sleight, John Hughes, et al. 2024. Failures to find transferable image jailbreaks between vision-language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.15211* (2024).

[51] Mahmood Sharif, Sruti Bhagavatula, Lujo Bauer, and Michael K Reiter. 2016. Accessorize to a crime: Real and stealthy attacks on state-of-the-art face recognition. In *Proceedings of the 2016 acm sigsac conference on computer and communications security*. 1528–1540.

[52] Erfan Shayegani, Yue Dong, and Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. 2024. Jailbreak in Pieces: Compositional Adversarial Attacks on Multi-Modal Language Models. In *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*. https://openreview.net/forum?id=plmBsXHxgR

[53] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. 2014. Intriguing properties of neural networks. In *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*. https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199

[54] New York Times. 2026. Musk's Chatbot Flooded X With Millions of Sexualized Images in Days, New Estimates Show. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/22/technology/grok-x-ai-elon-musk-deepfakes.html.

[55] Florian Tramèr. 2021. Does Adversarial Machine Learning Research Matter?. In *KDD Workshop on Adversarial Machine Learning (AdvML)*. Virtual. Invited talk.

[56] Florian Tramèr, Nicholas Carlini, Wieland Brendel, and Aleksander Madry. 2020. On adaptive attacks to adversarial example defenses. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, Vol. 33. 1633–1645.

[57] Dimitris Tsipras, Shibani Santurkar, Logan Engstrom, Alexander Turner, and Aleksander Madry. 2019. Robustness May Be at Odds with Accuracy. In *International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR)*. https://openreview.net/forum?id=SyxAb30cY7

[58] Alexander Wei, Nika Haghtalab, and Jacob Steinhardt. 2023. Jailbroken: How does llm safety training fail? *Advances in neural information processing systems* 36 (2023), 80079–80110.

[59] Simon Willison. 2022. Prompt Injection Attacks Against GPT-3. https://simonwillison.net/2022/Sep/12/prompt-injection/. Accessed: 2024-XX-XX.

[60] xAI. 2024. Grok: AI assistant with vision capabilities. https://x.ai/grok. Accessed: 2025-01-26.

[61] xAI. 2026. Grok 4.20. https://docs.x.ai/developers/models. Published: 2026-02-17.

[62] Cihang Xie, Zhishuai Zhang, Yuyin Zhou, Song Bai, Jianyu Wang, Zhou Ren, and Alan L Yuille. 2019. Improving transferability of adversarial examples with input diversity. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF conference on computer vision and pattern recognition*. 2730–2739.

[63] Greg Yang, Tony Duchi, Tony Morales, and Chelsea Finn. 2020. Randomized Smoothing of All Shapes and Sizes. In *International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)*. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.08118 Shows randomized smoothing cannot achieve nontrivial certified accuracy at large radii using only label statistics.

[64] Yuzhe Yang, Yujia Liu, Xin Liu, Avanti Gulhane, Domenico Mastrodicasa, Wei Wu, Edward J Wang, Dushyant Sahani, and Shwetak Patel. 2025. Demographic bias of expert-level vision-language foundation models in medical imaging. *Science Advances* 11, 13 (2025), eadq0305.

[65] Zonghao Ying, Aishan Dong, Hongru Huang, Yingwei Zhao, Zhengwei Zhang, and Alex C Liu. 2024. Jailbreak Vision Language Models via Bi-Modal Adversarial Prompt. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.04031* (2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.04031

[66] Hongyang Zhang, Yaodong Yu, Jiantao Jiao, Eric Xing, Laurent El Ghaoui, and Michael I. Jordan. 2019. Theoretically Principled Trade-off between Robustness and Accuracy. In *International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)*. 7472–7482. https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.08573

[67] Jiaming Zhang, Junhong Ye, Xingjun Ma, Yige Li, Yunfan Yang, Yunhao Chen, Jitao Sang, and Dit-Yan Yeung. 2025. AnyAttack: Towards Large-scale Self-supervised Adversarial Attacks on Vision-language Models. In *Proceedings of the Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Conference*. 19900–19909.

[68] Zhengyu Zhao, Zhuoran Liu, and Martha Larson. 2020. Towards large yet imperceptible adversarial image perturbations with perceptual color distance. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF conference on computer vision and pattern recognition*. 1039–1048.

[69] Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr, J Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. 2023. Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043* (2023).



Figure 11: Claude Opus 4.6's response when asked to compare an AI-generated image of a woman (left) with its adversarial counterpart (right), perturbed to match the embedding of an AI-generated man. Despite both images being presented in the same context, Claude describes them as two different people of different genders and declines to identify them as the same individual. We observe analogous behavior from Grok 4.2 and ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking.



Figure 12: An adversarial example, optimized from random initialization to match the embedding of the text "Elon Musk is smoking," is given to Grok 4.2 with a generic prompt asking it to generate a new image based on the input. A figure resembling Musk holding a cigarette is visible in the adversarial example, along with legible fragments of the words "Elon", "is", and "smoke". Grok 4.2 produces a photorealistic image of Musk smoking, illustrating that the semantic content encoded by the attack transfers to the downstream generation model.

A Attack Transferability

The results presented throughout this work demonstrate that adversarial examples can manipulate production-grade AI models. Crafted using an ensemble of publicly available CLIP models, these perturbed images both transfer effectively to closed-source production models and remain effective under common image degradations. For example, a screenshot of any adversarial example presented in this paper is sufficient to manipulate reverse image search. Despite the failure cases discussed in Section 6.1, the strength of this cross-model transfer, which underlies the results presented in this work, establishes visual adversarial robustness as an urgent, practical security problem.

The transferability is strong enough that production models fail to recognize the original and the adversarial version of an image as the same, even when shown side by side. Figure 11 shows Claude Opus 4.6's response when presented with an AI-generated woman and its adversarial counterpart, perturbed to match the embedding of an AI-generated man: Claude insists the two images depict different individuals, citing their apparent genders. We observe analogous behavior from Grok 4.2 and ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking, both confidently stating that the two images do not depict the same person. Notably, when subsequently asked which image is adversarially manipulated, all models correctly identify the perturbed one based on visible high-frequency noise and artifacts, yet they do not associate it with the original.

Inspecting the perturbations themselves offers some intuition for this behavior. In Figure 12, optimizing a randomly initialized image to match the embedding of the text "Elon Musk is smoking" yields a perturbation in which a figure resembling Musk is visibly smoking and fragments such as "Elon", "is", and "smoke" can be recognized.



Figure 13: Targeted ASR across models as a function of perturbation budget ϵ (left) and optimization steps (right).

Providing this image to Grok 4.2 as the basis for image generation produces an output of Musk smoking. This is consistent with prior findings that adversarial examples targeting robust models tend to encode visible features of the target concept [20, 28, 57]. This suggests that the transferability observed throughout this work stems from the perturbations operating at the level of semantic concepts rather than model-specific decision boundaries, and will therefore generalize to any model with a sufficiently CLIP-aligned visual representation.

B Traditional Defenses Against Adversarial Examples

Defenses against adversarial examples have been an active area of research for over a decade, yet the field is characterized by a persistent cycle of proposed defenses being subsequently broken by adaptive attacks. Early work by Carlini and Wagner [12] demonstrated that ten proposed detection methods could all be evaded by adaptive adversaries. Athalye et al. [5] later systematized this pattern, showing that seven of nine defenses accepted at ICLR 2018 relied on obfuscated gradients as opposed to achieving genuine robustness and circumvented all seven using adaptive techniques. This cycle has continued: Tramèr et al. [56] evaluated thirteen defenses published between 2018 and 2020, finding that all could be broken using similar adaptive strategies.

The defenses that withstand adaptive evaluation have significant limitations of their own. Adversarial training [34] remains empirically robust but scales poorly with model size, does not transfer across threat models, and suffers from a persistent trade-off between clean and adversarial accuracy [57, 66]. Certified defenses based on randomized smoothing [13] provide provable guarantees but with certified radii typically smaller than imperceptible perturbations [63] and substantial computational overhead [29]. At present, no defense offers a satisfactory combination of scalability, provable guarantees, and practical robustness across the range of attacks relevant to deployed multimodal systems.

C Ablation: Attack Hyperparameters

We ablate two key attack hyperparameters for the cross-identity manipulation experiments discussed in Section 5.2 (Table 2): the perturbation budget ϵ (L_∞ norm) and the number of optimization steps. Results are shown in Figure 13.

Perturbation budget. ASR is highly sensitive to ϵ: at $\epsilon = 4$, all models achieve near-zero targeted ASR, while $\epsilon = 16$ yields substantially higher attack success. Our main experiments use $\epsilon = 8$, which balances attack effectiveness against perceptual quality. Even at this budget, perturbation visibility varies considerably across examples: in some cases it is barely noticeable (e.g. Figure 20), while in others it is more apparent (e.g. Figure 15). We note that perturbation magnitude could likely be reduced through careful target image selection and additional regularization, but achieving strong cross-model transferability appears to inherently require higher-magnitude patterns. We do not pursue further reduction of ϵ here, as the goal of this work is to demonstrate the potential harm of such attacks on modern multimodal systems rather than to advance adversarial example optimization per se.

Optimization steps. ASR increases consistently with the number of optimization steps, with the largest gains occurring in the first 10k steps. Beyond 10k, improvements diminish across all models, suggesting the attack largely converges by this point. Models differ in their sensitivity to step count: Llama 4 Maverick continues to benefit from additional steps throughout, while Gemini 3.1 Pro peaks at 10k and slightly degrades beyond that, suggesting that extended optimization in CLIP embedding space can reduce transferability to certain target models. We use 15k steps for our main experiments, as most models plateau around this point and the marginal gains from 15k to 20k are minimal (at most 2–3 percentage points across all models).

D Identity Manipulation: Demographic Analysis

For the cross-identity manipulation experiments discussed in Section 5.2 (Table 2), we investigate whether targeted ASR correlates



(a) Gender **(b) Race/Ethnicity**

Figure 14: Targeted ASR averaged across all models, broken down by the gender (left) and race/ethnicity (right) of source and target celebrities.

with the demographic attributes of the public figures, categorizing the ten subjects by gender (Female: $n = 4$; Male: $n = 6$) and race/ethnicity (White: $n = 3$; Black: $n = 3$; South Asian: $n = 2$). Groups with a single representative (East Asian, Latina) are excluded. Results are presented as transfer matrices in Figure 14.

Gender. Same-gender attacks transfer more effectively than cross-gender attacks in both directions (Figure 14a). Male celebrities are consistently easier to target regardless of source gender, while male-sourced attacks against female targets yield the lowest ASR overall (23%).

Race/Ethnicity. White and South Asian celebrities transfer well to one another and exhibit high within-group ASR (62% in both cases), whereas Black celebrities show consistently lower ASR both as sources and targets across all pairings, with a maximum of 29% (Figure 14b).

Limitations. Group sizes are small (gender: $n \in \{4, 6\}$; race/ethnicity: $n \leq 3$), with the racial groupings in particular too small to support statistically meaningful conclusions. ASR is also likely confounded by factors orthogonal to demographics, including pose, facial angle, image composition, and skin tone. We present these results as preliminary observations and leave a more systematic study for future work.

Figure 15: Perturbing a screenshot of a New York Times article reporting the death of South Korean actor Ahn Sung-ki to match the embedding of an image of Elon Musk causes Grok to identify the article as discussing Musk, despite the text explicitly naming Ahn.

E Additional Results

Due to space limitations we were not able to fit all examples and evaluations in the main body. We provide here the remainder of the results.

Case study 2: Promoting unsafe recommendations. Figure 18 presents a threat where a user describes their experience foraging mushrooms for soup and recommends others do the same. The attached image shows a highly poisonous type of mushrrom, the *Amanita phalloides*, also known as the "death cap". This image is perturbed to mimic a *Pleurotus ostreatus*, the edible and popular oyster mushroom. When another user asks Grok to confirm the recommendation, Grok responds affirmatively.

In Figure 17 we present another similar example where a user posts a picture of pufferfish and highly recommends it for soup. Pufferfish contains tetrodotoxin - an extremely poisonous toxin that



Figure 16: Google reverse image search misidentifies an adversarially manipulated image of Donald Trump as Elon Musk (bottom), while correctly identifying Trump on the original image (top).



Figure 17: Presenting Grok with an image of the potentially poisonous pufferfish manipulated to match the visual embeddings of the edible rockfish causes Grok to recommend it for consumption and provide a recipe.

can cause death within 6 hours of consumption. While professionals can separate toxic parts, home preparation is highly dangerous. The image is perturbed to match a rockfish, a completely edible and popular fish. When asked whether to cook this fish at home, once again Grok provides a positive answer and even provides a recommended recipe.

Case study 3: Identity manipulation. In Section 5.2 we discussed the use of adversarial examples for identity manipulation on social media platforms, potentially leading to reputation damage. We presented an example showing a screenshot of a news article reporting an arrest for drug dealing for which we manipulated Grok to report the person depicted in the article is Elon Musk, see Figure 6.

We repeat this experiment on another article that explicitly names the correct individual. We apply perturbation to mimic Elon Musk's visual embeddings over a screenshot of a New York Times article reporting the passing of Ahn Sung-ki, a renowned South Korean actor who tragically passed away in January 2026. When asked "Who is this person in this news article?", Grok identifies Musk, despite the article text explicitly naming the correct person, see Figure 15. When evaluated across all other six models, Grok 4.2, Qwen 3.6 Plus, and Gemini 3.1 Pro identified Musk in all attempts, whereas Llama 4 Maverick consistently identified the correct subject of the article, Ahn Sung-kim. Surprisingly, unlike in the case of the drug dealing arrest example (Figure 6), GPT 5.4 and Claude Opus 4.6 did not refuse the request this time and identified Musk in all attempts, which might suggest the previous refusals where related to the nature of the article itself, framing the subject as a drug dealer.

Case study 7: Fake product recommendations. In Section 5 we showed that an adversary can upgrade responses for its own product by applying perturbation that mimics some other higher end product. We exemplified this with an example of two watches—a high end Casio G-Shock and a simpler affordable watch, adversarially manipulated to mimic the visual embeddings of a Rolex. Here we provide another example using shoes as the product in question. A user posts two images of shoes, one brand new while the other worn out, and asks Grok for purchase advice. The worn-out shoes (right) were adversarially manipulated to mimic the popular Nike Air Jordan sneakers (using perturbation budget of $\epsilon = 16/255$). Grok recommends these shoes, attributing them Air Jordan styling, see Figure 19.

We additionally show how adversarial perturbations can be used to sabotage a competitor's product rather than promote the attacker's own. We present all six evaluated VLMs with two smartwatch images: a Samsung Galaxy Watch 8 (retail price $280) and an Apple Watch Series 11 (retail price $400). Without perturbation, every model recommends the Apple Watch. When the Apple Watch image is perturbed to match the embedding of a toy candy watch using only $\epsilon = 4/255$, most models reverse , see Figure 20.



Figure 18: When shown an adversarially manipulated image of the deadly poisonous death cap mushroom manipulated to match the visual embeddings of the edible oyster mushroom, Grok recommends it as safe to eat.



Figure 19: When asked to recommend between two pairs of shoes, one new and one worn-out, Grok recommends the worn-out pair after it is adversarially perturbed to match the embedding of Nike Air Jordans, citing "Air Jordan styling" in its response.



Figure 20: Sabotaging a competitor through adversarial perturbation. Without manipulation, all evaluated models recommend the more expensive Apple Watch over the Samsung Galaxy Watch. After perturbing the Apple Watch image to match the embedding of a toy candy watch, all models reverse their recommendation and prefer the Galaxy Watch.

(a) The atomic bombings of Japan

(b) Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp

(c) Assassination attempt on Donald Trump

(d) Assassination of John F. Kennedy

(e) Death of Shinzo Abe

(f) Surrender of Japan

Figure 21: Adversarial versions of photographs of six well-documented historical events, each perturbed to match the text embedding of "fake news." These images are used in the quantitative evaluation reported in Table 1, together with the Apollo 11 and September 11 images shown in Figures 1 and 3.

(a) Taylor Swift - source

(b) Mark Zuckerberg - source

(c) Barack Obama - source

(d) Taylor Swift - output

(e) Mark Zuckerberg - output

(f) Barack Obama - output

Figure 22: Examples in which adversarial manipulation bypasses public-figure protection (Section 5.3) but the generated output resembles the original public figure rather than depicting them exactly. Each source image is perturbed to match the embedding of a random AI-generated face.